Copyright USGenNet Inc., 2015 All Rights Reserved USGenNet Data Repository Please read USGenNet Copyright Statement on this page: Transcribed and submitted by Linda Talbott for the USGenNet Data Repository http://www.us-data.org/ =========================================================================== Formatted by USGenNet Data Repository Chief Archivist, Linda Talbott All of the above information must remain when copied or downloaded. =========================================================================== (note: while some formatting changes were necessary to transcribe this document the content remains entirely as written in the official report.) From: Marine Board of Investigation To: Commandant (G-MMI) Subj: S. S. EDMUND FITZGERALD, O. N. 277437; sinking in Lake Superior on 10 November 1975, with loss of life FINDINGS OF FACT (continued) ---------------- 4. Weather ------- A storm, which was described by a National Weather Service forecaster as "a typical November storm," was generated over the Oklahoma Panhandle on 8 November (all dates referred to here- after in this report will assume the year 1975 and all times referred to will be Eastern Standard Time unless specifically identified otherwise), and by 0700, on 9 November, this well- defined storm was located over south-central Kansas, moving to the northeast, with a minimum barometric pressure of 29.53" Hg. The National Weather Service issued 12-, 24- and 36-hour Surface Weather Forecasts at 0700, on 9 November, predicting that the storm center would travel in a northeasterly direction and pass just south of Lake Superior by 1900 on 10 November. The storm was centered over the northeast corner of Kansas by 1300 on 9 November with a minimum barometric pressure of 29.40" Hg and an average speed of advance of 19 knots. The National Weather Service issued 12- and 24-hour Surface Weather Forecasts Maps at this time which predicted that the storm would shift to a more northerly direction, pass over Lake Superior east of Michipicoten Island and increase in speed. The storm center was predicted to be over James Bay, Canada by 1900 on 10 November. The storm intensified rapidly as it passed over east central Iowa and, by 1900 on 9 November, it had a minimum barometric pressure of 29.33" Hg and an average speed of advance of 37 knots. At this time, the National Weather Service issued Gale Warnings for all of Lake Superior. Winds in the eastern half of the lake were predicted to be "East to Northeast, increasing to 25 to 37 knots during the night, and Northeasterly 28 to 38 knots, shifting to Northwest to Northerly 30 to 40 knots by Monday (10 November) afternoon, waves 5 to 10 feet. 18 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The National Weather Service revised the forecast at 2239 on 9 November, the next scheduled broadcast, predicting "Easter- ly winds 32 to 42 knots becoming Southeasterly Monday morning, and West to Southwest 35 to 45 knots Monday afternoon, rain and thunderstorms, waves 5 to 10 feet increasing to 8 to 15 feet Monday." Wave heights in National Weather Service forecasts refer to the distance from peak to trough and are "significant wave height." Significant wave height is a statistical evaluation, roughly equivalent to the average height of the highest one- third of the waves. The actual distance from peak to trough of the highest wave could be as much as twice the significant wave height. Officials of the National Weather Service stated that significant wave height is very close to the wave height ship- board personnel report in weather observations. The storm continued to intensify and to move to the north- east, and, as its center passed over central Wisconsin at 0100, 10 November, it had a minimum barometric pressure of 29.24" Hg and an average speed of advance of 29 knots. The Gale Warnings were increased to Storm Warnings at 0200 on 10 November, when a special warning was issued with a prediction of "Northeast winds 35 to 50 knots becoming Northwesterly 28 to 38 knots on Monday, waves 8 to 15 feet." The storm continued on its northeasterly track and its center had passed over Marquette, MI, by 0700, 10 November, with a minimum barometric pressure of 29.00" Hg and an average speed of advance of 22 knots. The National Weather Service revised the forecast for Eastern Lake Superior at 1034, 10 November, predicting "North to Northwest winds 32 to 48 knots this afternoon becoming Northwesterly 25 to 48 knots tonight and Westerly 20 to 30 knots Tuesday, waves 8 to 16 feet decreasing Tuesday." 19 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The storm center crossed Lake Superior to the west of Michipicoten Island and was over White River, ONT, at 1300, 10 November, with a minimum barometric pressure of 28.95" Hg and an average speed of advance of 21 knots. As predicted, a line of shifting winds followed the storm center, with winds hauling from the northeast, then continuing to haul and increasing rapidly to 35 to 50 knots from the northwest. The windshift line extended from north-northeast to south-southwest, and, at 1300, 10 November, was approximately 20 miles west of Caribou Island, ONT, moving eastward at 20 to 25 knots. At the next regular broadcast, at 1639, the National Weather Service revised the forecast for Eastern Lake Superior, predicting "Northwest winds 38 to 52 knots with gusts to 60 knots early tonight and Northwesterly winds 25 to 35 knots diminishing Tuesday, waves 8 to 16 feet tonight decreasing Tuesday." The storm continued on its northeasterly track and by 1900 on 10 November its center had passed over the southern tip of James Bay, Canada, and by 0100, 11 November, the storm center was over eastern Hudson Bay as the effects of the severe storm abated on Lake Superior. At 0100, 10 November, FITZGERALD was approximately 20 miles due south of Isle Royal and reported winds from 030"T at 52 knots, overcast, visibility two to five miles in continuous heavy rain, temperature 37°F, waves 10 feet. At 0700, FITZGER- ALD was approximately 35 miles north of Copper Harbor, MI, and reported winds from 050°T at 35 knots, overcast, visibility two to five miles in continuous moderate rain, temperature 41°F, waves 10 feet. The 0700 report was the last weather report received from FITZGERALD. The SS ARTHUR M ANDERSON filed 0100 and 0700 weather reports from approximately the same positions as reported by FITZGERALD and the reports from ANDERSON substantially agreed with those from FITZGERALD. At 1300, 10 November, ANDERSON was approximately 20 miles northwest of Michipicoten Island, near the center of the storm, and reported winds from 150°T at 20 20 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- knots, visibility 10 to 25 miles, no precipitation, and waves 12 feet. At 1900, ANDERSON reported winds from 300°T at 50 knots, visibility 10 to 25 miles in light rain and snow, and waves 16 feet. The Motor Vessel SIMCOE (Canadian), approximately 15 miles to the southwest of the ANDERSON at 1300, 10 November, reported winds from 270°T at 44 knots, visibility 10 to 25 miles, no precipitation, and waves 7 feet. At this time, the remote weather reporting station at Stannard Rock was reporting winds from the WNW at 50 knots, gusting to 59 knots, and the station at Whitefish Point was reporting SSW at 19 knots, gusting to 34 knots. At 1900, Stannard Rock was reporting WNW at 40 knots, gusting to 65 knots, and the Whitefish Point Station was inopera- tive. 5. Last Voyage ----------- At approximately 0830, on 9 November, FITZGERALD commenced loading taconite at Burlington Northern Railroad Dock No. 1, in Superior, WI. Fuel was also taken on at this time. FITZGERALD completed loading and fueling at approximately 1415 and crewmembers were observed replacing the hatch covers. There were no unusual incidents or occurrences and this appeared to be a routine loading and departure. FITZGERAL departed for Detroit immediately and proceeded at full speed of 99 r.p.m., approximately 16.3 mph. (It is conventional on the Great Lakes to describe distances in statute miles (mi) and speeds in statute miles per hour (mph), and distances and speeds referred to hereafter in this report will follow this convention unless specifically identified other- wise.) After about two hours, FITZGERALD reached the area near Two Harbors, MN. The SS ARTHUR M ANDERSON, one of the vessels 21 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- of the United States Steel Corp., had departed Two Harbors at 1630. ANDERSON, with a cargo similar to FITZGERALD's, was bound for Gary, IN, and the two vessels proceeded eastward on similar courses, separated by 10 to 20 miles. FITZGERALD made routine weather reports at 0100 and at 0700, 10 November, and at 0720 made the normal radio morning report to the company office. This report indicated that the ETA at Sault Ste. Marie was indefinite due to weather. Because of the storm, FITZGERALD departed from the recom- mended Great Lakes shipping lanes at the southern shore of the lake, and headed northeastward, approximately half way between Isle Royal and the Keewanaw Peninsula, turning eastward to parallel the northern shore of Lake Superior and then southeast- ward along along the eastern shore. By 1300, 10 November, FITZGERALD was approximately 11 miles northwest of Michipicoten Island. FITZGERALD passed to the west of Michipicoten West End Light, and changed course to pass north and east of Caribou Island, heading generally southeastward towards Whitefish Bay, MI. FITZGERALD sank sometime after 1915 at a position of 46°59.9'N, 85°06.6'W, near the International Boundary Line. Figure (5) (p. 33) is a chart of Lake Superior, showing Michipicoten and Caribou Islands, Whitefish Bay and the position where the wreckage of FITZGERALD was located. The SS ARTHUR M. ANDERSON, making turns for a speed of 14.6 mph, which it maintained during the entire transit of Lake Superior, joined FITZGERALD at approximately 1700, 9 November. Shortly thereafter, ANDERSON received notice of Gale 22 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Warnings. Sometime after 0200 on 10 November, CAPT Cooper, Master of ANDERSON, contacted CAPT McSorley, Master of FITZGER- ALD, on VHF/FM radiotelephone. CAPT Cooper had just received the notification of Storm Warnings which predicted northeast winds to 50 knots. During this conversation, both Captains expressed concern over the deteriorating weather. They agreed to depart from the normal shipping lanes which are at the southern shore of the lake and proceed on a more northeasterly course in order to be in the lee of the Canadian shore. At 0300, ANDERSON changed course to 055°T and logged winds from 034°T at 42 knots while FITZGERALD headed 060°T. Up until now, FITZGERALD had been close behind ANDERSON, now she was pulling ahead slightly because of her faster speed. At 0400, the First Mate, Morgan Clark, came on watch on ANDERSON, and the two vessels proceeded along together throughout his watch. The First Mate was relieved for the 8-12 watch by the Third Mate, Bernard Dorobek. At 0953, Dorobek changed course and headed due east, and at 1030, when approximately 25 miles from shore, he changed course to 125°T, heading southeastward along the Canadian shore. Watch officers on board ANDERSON observed that FITZGERALD went closer toward the shore before heading south. Because ANDERSON was, in effect, cutting corners, it was able to keep up with the faster FITZGERALD. At 1152, the Third Mate changed course to 149°T. The weather recorded at this time was overcast with winds from 158°T at 30 knots. The barometer had dropped rapidly and was now 28.84, waves 10 to 12 feet. 23 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Second Mate, Roy Anderson, assumed the 1200-1600 watch on board ANDERSON and sent the 1800Z weather report at 1240 (weather reports were made in Greenwich Mean Time, designated Z; 1800Z corresponds to 1300 Eastern Standard Time). At 1252, the Second Mate, steering 148° to make 149°T, recorded a beam bearing 10.8 miles off Otterhead. He changed course at this time to 154°T, intending to clear Michipicoten Island West End Light by 2 to 2-1/2 miles. At this time, FITZGERALD was 7 or 8 miles ahead and to the east of ANDERSON's heading, and the two vessels appeared to be on slightly converg- ing courses. At approximately 1340, CAPT Cooper talked with CAPT McSor- ley and said that he anticipated that the wind would shift to the northwest. He told CAPT McSorley that he intended to "haul" (i.e. change course) to the west, before passing Michi- picoten Island, in order to insure that the seas were astern. CAPT McSorley, whose vessel was just past Michipicoten, indi- cated that he would continue on, although his vessel was "rolling some." CAPT Cooper observed that FITZGERALD changed course after passing Michipicoten Island. Since no plot of FITZGERALD was maintained, this was the only course change that the Master or Watch Officers of ANDERSON were sure that FITZGER- ALD made after passing Michipicoten. At 1350, ANDERSON logged a course change to 230°T and steered it without "holding up" any for the wind. The Second Mate observed that just before this course change, FITZGERALD was about 9 or 10 miles ahead and slightly to the starboard. He assumed that FITZGERALD was steering a course of 141°, and estimated that FITZGERALD would have passed off the western end of Michipicoten Island at a distance of 3 miles. CAPT Cooper estimated the distance to be approximately 2-1/2 miles. The weather was logged as overcast, winds 5 knots from 304°T, visibility fair. 24 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- After ten minutes on the new course of 230°T, at 1400, the Second Mate took a radar range and bearing which he did not record in the ship's log. This placed ANDERSON on the trackline drawn for 230°T. At 1425, the Second Mate took another "fix" by radar, which again he did not log. This one placed the vessel on the trackline, 3.9 miles beyond the 1400 position. At 1445, ANDERSON logged a course change to 130°T. The Second Mate "held up" one degree for wind, and ordered the Wheelsman to steer 131°. This course was set in order to pass clear of the 6-fathom shoal approximately four miles north of Caribou Island. By the time ANDERSON was steady on the new course, FITZGERALD was observed to be approximately 16 miles ahead, winds had increased to 42 knots from 315°T, and it had started snowing. As a result, ANDERSON lost sight of FITZGERALD and it was never seen again. At 1520, the Second Mate logged ANDERSON abeam of Michipico- ten Island West End Light at a distance of 7.7 miles. The seas were beginning to build rapidly from the northwest and on the 130° course, CAPT Cooper thought his ship was being set down too close to Caribou Island, so the course was changed to 125°T. This new course was "shaped up" to clear the 6-fathom shoal north of Caribou Island and to reach a point 6 miles off the island. After ANDERSON steadied on the 125° course, the Mate on watch observed that FITZGERALD was a little over 16 miles ahead of ANDERSON and a "shade" to the right of dead ahead. CAPT Cooper estimated the angle as a point to a point and a half to the right. FITZGERALD's position then was observed to open further to the right of ANDERSON's heading flasher. Watch officers on ANDERSON stated that no plot of FITZGERALD was maintained and they did not know whether the change in the relative position of FITZGERALD resulted from the divergent courses of the two vessels or whether FITZGERALD had made 25 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- another course change. While ANDERSON was on this course, FITZGERALD was observed to have passed north and east of Caribou Island. CAPT Cooper testified that he estimated that FITZGERALD had passed close to the six-fathom shoal north of Caribou Island. He also testified that he told the Mate on watch on ANDERSON that FITZGERALD was closer to this shoal than he wanted ANDERSON to be. At 1520, ANDERSON recorded steady winds of 43 knots from the northwest and it was still snowing. The seas were 12 to 16 feet, and ANDERSON was shipping a considerable quantity of water on deck. The First Mate relieved the Second Mate of the watch at 1520, and between 1530 and 1535, while the Second Mate was still in the pilothouse and at a time when the Captain was there also, FITZGERALD called ANDERSON. CAPT Cooper, on ANDERSON, answered the call and the two watch officers listened. Reports of this conversaton varied, but it was generally agreed that FITZGERALD reported a fence rail down, two vents lost or damaged, and a list. Both the Master and the Mates who heard this report testified that they understood this to mean the loss of ballast tank vents and a small list. FITZGERALD told ANDERSON that she would "check down," i.e., reduce speed, to allow ANDERSON to close the distance between them. Whoever it was that was speaking on FITZGERALD did not identify himself, although everyone on the bridge of ANDERSON believed that it was CAPT McSorley. CAPT Cooper asked CAPT McSorley if he had "his pumps going" and the reply was: "Yes, both of them." CAPT Cooper noted that at this time the radar indicated that FITZGERALD was approximately 17 miles ahead of ANDERSON and a point to a point and a half to the right of ANDERSON's heading. CAPT Cooper agreed to keep track of FITZ- GERALD. None of the officers on ANDERSON who heard this conver- sation felt that it indicated any real concern about the welfare of FITZGERALD. 26 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Shortly after this, ANDERSON received a Coast Guard broad- cast that the Sault Ste. Marie locks had been closed and that all ships should seek a safe anchorage. Between 1610 and 1615, ANDERSON was informed by FITZGERALD that her "radars weren't working." CAPT Cooper was not in the wheelhouse at this time. FITZGERALD asked if ANDERSON would keep track of them and provide navigational assistance, and the First Mate on watch on ANDERSON agreed. At a time that CAPT Cooper estimated to be between 1600 and 1630, FITZGERALD was observed to pass approximately three to five miles east of Caribou Island, its closest point of approach to the island. At 1620, on ANDERSON, the Second Mate relieved the First Mate for dinner. At 1630, it grew dark and the Second Mate noted that the radar showed FITZGERALD was approximately 16 miles ahead and "possibly between one to two degrees, maybe" to the right of ANDERSON's heading. At 1652, the Mate on ANDERSON logged a position abeam of the north tip of Caribou Island at a distance of 6 miles, and the course was changed to 141°T. The wheelsman was ordered to steer 142° because of the expected eastward drift. The 1652 position was not plotted on the chart in use in the pilothouse of ANDERSON. CAPT Cooper later testified that the course change was made at a point north- northeast of the northern tip of Caribou Island at a distance of approximately 7-1/2 miles, and that five minutes later, at 1652, ANDERSON passed abeam of Caribou on the 141° course at a distance of 6 miles. On the chart he plotted during his testi- mony, the point of the course change and the point of passing abeam of Caribou are 4 miles apart. On the new course, FITZGER- ALD was observed to be about one mile to the right of ANDERSON's heading flasher and 14 to 15 miles ahead. At the time of this course change, ANDERSON logged winds of 58 knots from 304°T, the highest winds recorded during the voyage. It was still snowing lightly, limiting visibility, and seas were 12 to 18 feet. 27 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The First Mate returned from the dinner relief and resumed the watch just as the course was being changed. Sometime later, FITZGERALD called ANDERSON and requested a position. The First Mate took a radar range and bearing which showed that ANDERSON was 10.5 miles on a bearing of 088°T from Caribou Island Light. The First Mate testified that he received the call from FITZGER- ALD and took the fix at 1701. He also noted that the radar showed FITZGERALD was 15 miles ahead of ANDERSON and "just a shade" to the left of the heading marker. He informed FITZGER- ALD that Whitefish Point was 35 miles on a bearing of 144°T from FITZGERALD's position. FITZGERALD replied, "Thanks," and that (they) "wanted to be 2 to 2-1/2 miles off of Whitefish Point." The Mate on ANDERSON estimated that with the drift, FITZGERALD was probably headed for that point. CAPT Cooper testified that at around 1800, when approxi- mately 15 miles southeast of Caribou Island, and just out of its lee, ANDERSON encountered heavy seas with some waves which were as high as 25 feet. At 1810, CAPT Cooper left the wheelhouse and went below. At 1820, the First Mate called FITZGERALD again and asked what course they were steering because they appeared to be working to the left of ANDERSON. They replied they were steering 141°T. At 1849, the First Mate sent the 0000Z weather to the Coast Guard at Grand Marais. ANDERSON's position on the weather report was approximately two miles to the west of the trackline presented when the Master and Mates testified. At 1900, the Mate informed FITZGERALD that they were 10 miles ahead and 1-1/2 to 2 miles to the left of ANDERSON's heading flasher, and that FITZGERALD was thus 15 miles from the Highlands at Crisp Point. At 1910, the Mate called FITZGERALD again and told them, "There is a target 19 miles ahead of us, so the target is nine miles on ahead." FITZGERALD asked, "Well, am I going to clear?" and the Mate said, "Yes, he 28 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- is going to pass to the west of you." FITZGERALD replied, "Well, fine." As the Mate started to sign off, he asked, "Oh, by the way, how are you making out with your problems?" and FITZGERALD replied, "We are holding our own." The Mate replied, "Okay, fine, I will be talking to you later." This was the last transmission heard from FITZGERALD. Just as this conversation ended, at around 1910, CAPT Cooper returned to the pilothouse, and he testified that at that time ANDERSON was 25 miles north- northwest of Whitefish Point, with the radar showing FITZGERALD 9 miles ahead and a mile to a mile and a half to the east of the heading flasher. This was the last time that anyone on ANDERSON observed a target on the radar that they were certain was FITZGERALD. Shortly thereafter, it stopped snowing and visibility improved considerably. At this time the Wheelsman on ANDERSON thought that he saw a red and a white light on the port bow, with the white one forward of the red one. He concluded that the red light was on the shore and then mentioned the white light to the rest of the bridge watch, but no one else was able to see it. The Mate could now see lights which he believed to be those of one of the upbound, saltwater ships, NANFRI, SENFRI and AVAFORS, which were 17 to 18 miles ahead. Because FITZGER- ALD should have been closer, he was surprised that he could not see her lights. CAPT Cooper thought that FITZGERALD might have had a blackout and told everyone on the bridge to look for a silhouette on the horizon. At this time the First Mate believed that FITZGERALD should have been 13 to 14 miles due west of Coppermine Point. CAPT Cooper recalled it as 15 miles north of Crisp Point and 14 miles west of Coppermine Point. At 1920, after adjusting the radar, ANDERSON had three distinct targets, but none was FITZGERALD. CAPT Cooper then 29 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- tried to call FITZGERALD on VHF-FM, and there was no response. The Mate then tried to call FITZGERALD, and then one of the saltwater vessels, without success. He then called the SS WILLIAM CLAY FORD, which was anchored in Whitefish Bay. FORD replied to ANDERSON that his signal was good. CAPT Cooper stated he then tried to call the Coast Guard at Sault Ste. Marie on Channel 16 and was told to shift to Channel 12, but received no follow-up. CAPT Cooper then called NANFRI, which was upbound near Whitefish Point, and talked with the Great Lakes Registered Pilot, CAPT Jacovetti. CAPT Jacovetti told CAPT Cooper that he had no contacts on his radar which could be FITZGERALD. CAPT Jacovetti stated that this call was at 2000 or later. CAPT Cooper then called the Coast Guard again and expressed concern for the FITZGERALD. CAPT Cooper stated that the Coast Guardsman told him to watch for a lost 16-foot boat. Approximately ten minutes later, he called the Coast Guard at Sault Ste. Marie again, feeling that by this time it was "pretty evident that the FITZGERALD was gone." This time the Coast Guard tried calling FITZGERALD. CAPT Cooper later stated that he was down around Whitefish Point before he "got to thinking for sure that FITZGER- ALD was gone." ANDERSON was abeam of Whitefish Point at 2059 and at that time logged winds of 48 knots. Coast Guard Group Sault Ste. Marie logged a call from the ARTHUR M. ANDERSON on Channel 22 at 2032 in which CAPT Cooper said, "I am very concerned with the welfare of the Steamer EDMUND FITZGERALD. He was right in front of us experiencing a little difficulty. He was taking on a small amount of water and none of the upbound ships have passed him. I can see no lights as before and don't have him on radar. I just hope he didn't take a nose dive." This is the first recorded call from ANDER- SON and the station log makes no mention of a broadcast concern- ing a lost 16-foot boat. 30 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- At approximately 1639, the Coast Guard Station at Grand Marais, MI, received a call from FITZGERALD asking if Whitefish Point radio beacon was operating. The watch-stander at Grand Marais called Group Sault Ste. Marie on the teletype asking if the radio beacon was out. Group Sault Ste. Marie told him that there had been a power failure and that the equipment showed that Whitefish Radio beacon was not operating. Grand Marais called FITZGERALD back immediately and told them the beacon was not operating. Sometime between 1600 and 1630, CAPT Cedric C. Woodard, a Great Lakes Registered Pilot on board the Swedish vessel AVAFORS, upbound near Whitefish Point, answered a call from FITZGERALD for any vessel in the vicinity of Whitefish Point. FITZGERALD asked if Whitefish Point beacon or light was on. CAPT Woodard replied that he could neither see the light nor receive the beacon. Somewhat later, CAPT Woodard overheard FITZGERALD call the Coast Guard at Sault Ste. Marie and then at Grand Marais. He did not hear whether or not the Coast Guard answered. Approximately one hour after his first conversa- tion, CAPT Woodard called FITZGERALD and, after confirm- ing that he was speaking to CAPT McSorley, told him that Whitefish Point Light was on but the beacon was still off. At one point in this conversation, CAPT McSorley paused and, apparently in response to a question by someone on his ship, said, "Don't allow nobody on deck," and something else about a vent which CAPT Woodard was unable to understand. He then returned to his conversation with CAPT Woodard, saying that FITZGERALD had a "bad list," had lost both radars, and was taking heavy seas over the deck in one of the worst seas he had ever been in. 31 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- CAPT Woodard stated that during the time between his two conversations with FITZGERALD he overheard two conversations between FITZGERALD and ANDERSON. He did not recall the subject of the first conversation, but in the second one ANDERSON told FITZGERALD that it was about 20 miles above Whitefish "as near as he could tell," and ANDERSON was "about 10 miles behind you and gaining about a mile and a half an hour on you." 32 ===========================================================================